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 When we praise, blame, reward, or punish a person for doing something, 
it is usually because we think that person is  responsible for that action—and 
hence that the person is, in some significant sense, the author of his or 
her actions and thus deserves to be held accountable for them, as well as 
their consequences. Making these assignments of responsibility is utterly 
central to human life, yet exactly how to justify them remains an open 
question. 
 Common sense tells us that what makes human beings responsible has 
something to do with their minds, and with the relations between their 
minds and their actions. And we now have good reason to think that the 
brain accomplishes the functions of the mind, thanks to an era of rapid 
progress in neuroscience which began in the 1980s and has continued to 
gather momentum. This means that the issues surrounding responsibility 
can now be approached from a relatively secure empirical standpoint, from 
a branch of biology—neurobiology. Given this, if a defendant, on trial for 
a horrible murder, were found to have serious brain damage, which brain 
parts or processes would have to be damaged for this defendant to be con-
sidered less responsible, or not responsible at all? Why do certain men-
tal illnesses, with their corresponding profiles of brain dysfunction, seem 
to justify pleas of legal excuse? What is it about the developing brains of 
children and adolescents that makes them less culpable than adults, if not 
excused from responsibility altogether? 
 If a person’s mind is damaged or still developing, or if the person’s 
actions are fundamentally uncoupled from the person’s mental processes, 
we may judge the person less responsible for what he or she does, or per-
haps excuse the person from responsibility altogether. Indeed, the idea of 
a “guilty mind”—mens rea—lies at the core of the criminal law, a stable 
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viii Preface
and codified system of practices about whom to hold responsible, and for 
what. It seems obvious that the ability to reason has a great deal to do with 
being responsible, but exactly what sort of thinking or reasoning abilities 
are relevant in this way, and which brain processes accomplish them? What 
other brain functions are required for responsibility? Do all of these func-
tions together constitute a meaningful functional unit in the brain? Could 
one actually point to a place in the brain (or a network of such places) as 
the seat of human responsibility? 
 We believe that the answer to these last two questions is yes. In an 
attempt to answer the question of where the mechanisms of responsibility 
reside in the human brain, we have constructed a comprehensive hypoth-
esis about human responsibility couched ultimately in the language of 
neuroscience. In this book, we describe this theory, then put it to work 
addressing the above questions, comparing it with competing theories at 
each point. 
 This book is written to be accessible to virtually anyone interested in 
the above questions. Lawyers and other legal professionals should find our 
commonsense approach to responsibility congenial and practical. Medi-
cal professionals who make determinations of competency may also find 
this book useful. Within the academic community, the book should espe-
cially appeal to philosophers working on issues surrounding the concept 
of responsibility. More broadly, teachers or students in any of the cogni-
tive sciences, including philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, 
and artificial intelligence, who are interested in how their fields connect to 
issues in ethics may find this book worthwhile. 
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 Case Descriptions 
 Dominic Ongwen 
 It is the year 1990. A skinny boy named Dominic, perhaps ten or twelve 
years old, is abducted on his way to school in the Gulu District of northern 
Uganda. The men who have taken him are soldiers in the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA), a cultlike guerilla force led by the self-proclaimed prophet 
Joseph Kony. Dominic’s abductors literally carry him to the LRA base; he is 
too small to keep up with them on foot. 1 
 The son of schoolteachers, Dominic is now made to live with a middle-
aged LRA commander and to think of this man as a military superior, men-
tor, and surrogate father. He is told to forget his parents and former life, 
and taught to empty his mind so it can be filled with passionate devotion 
to the LRA’s holy cause. His indoctrination includes disorienting, exhaust-
ing periods of marching and hard labor punctuated by rituals of spiritual 
purification. In his daily intake of political and religious propaganda, he 
is told of Kony’s supernatural powers, including the ability to detect any 
sign of disloyalty, or even private misgivings. Punishment is harsh and 
capricious, perversely fostering blind trust in the group’s leaders and para-
noia about nearly everyone else. Dominic witnesses murder, enslavement, 
and rape used as tools of war and discipline and is himself subjected to 
regular beatings, sometimes for minor infractions and sometimes for 
no reason at all. He sees other recruits and captives beaten, mutilated, 
and killed. 
 Over the next few years, Dominic’s part in this milieu of violence shifts 
gradually from that of a passive witness to an eager accomplice and then to 
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2 Chapter 1
a primary enforcer. His military training intensifies, and he quickly shows 
himself to be a natural warrior—brave, intelligent, keen both to please his 
superiors and to assume his own command. According to charges filed in 
the International Criminal Court, he begins to plan and execute his own 
raids and abductions and engages in the same forms of indoctrination used 
on his younger self. The LRA measures a soldier’s loyalty by how many 
people he has killed or kidnapped, and in this Dominic proves exceptional. 
He is also lucky: While many of his peers and superior officers are killed, 
Dominic survives to adulthood. By 18 he is a field commander, and by 25 
he has secured a senior rank in the LRA’s high command, his promotion 
allegedly buttressed by an unknown number of brutal attacks, massacres, 
and abductions. 
 In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged Dominic 
Ongwen with crimes against humanity, including the murder and enslave-
ment of civilians. He surrendered to authorities in 2015 and is, as of this 
writing, on trial at the ICC. In the time between the first charges and his 
surrender, prosecutors have expanded the list of his charges to include 
over 70 criminal counts. Because he is known to have suffered many of the 
very crimes he is now accused of committing, Ongwen’s case is unusual—
he is the first figure of his kind to be subject to international criminal 
prosecution—but he is not unique in illustrating difficult questions about 
the culpability of child soldiers, many of whom appear to be both victims 
and perpetrators. 2 
 Reviewing the evidence against Ongwen, it seems likely he has been 
involved in dozens, perhaps hundreds of abductions and murders. But how 
many of these crimes is he truly responsible for? The brutalities enumer-
ated in his arrest warrants occurred during his early 20s, although he had 
surely caused many deaths before that time—and it is hard to see any of 
those deeds as disconnected from Ongwen’s childhood abduction and forc-
ible recruitment into the LRA. Pinning down the precise details of Ong-
wen’s biography has proven difficult, and it is unclear whether it matters 
exactly how old he was at the time of his kidnapping, or how old he was 
when he began to commit the crimes he is charged with. We know that 
many child soldiers, rather than participate actively in atrocities, try to 
“fade into the background,” risk escape, or even choose death; does it mat-
ter that Ongwen seems instead to have embraced the goals and tactics of 
the LRA? 
©MIT Press.  For review purposes only.
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 Anders Breivik 
 It is midday on July 22, 2011, and the final pieces of Anders Breivik’s plan 
are clicking into place. By nightfall he will be in police custody, and 77 
innocent persons will be dead by his hand. 3 
 At around 2:00 in the afternoon, Breivik sends out a mass e-mail contain-
ing a manifesto that sprawls over 1,500 pages. In it, he advocates violence 
against Muslims and rails against the multiculturalism and “cultural Marx-
ism” he sees as having infected European society. In the manifesto, and in 
subsequent interrogations, Breivik claims to be acting on behalf of a secret 
Christian military order, the Knights Templar, with dozens or hundreds of 
members throughout Western Europe. There is no evidence, however, that 
any such organization exists. 
 Shortly after sending the e-mail, the 32-year-old Breivik leaves his moth-
er’s flat in west Oslo, driving a white van into the government quarter. 
The van contains a bomb made of fertilizer and fuel oil, weighing over a 
ton, which he has spent the past months assembling. He is dressed in a 
homemade police uniform. He carries a pistol and a semiautomatic rifle, 
both acquired over years of planned, careful maneuvering through the legal 
conditions necessary for gun ownership in Norway. Breivik parks the van, 
lights a seven-minute fuse, and walks away. He gets into a different car, 
parked nearby the night before as part of his plot, and drives out of the 
city. At 3:25 p.m., the bomb explodes, killing eight people and injuring 
many more. 
 An hour and a half later, some 25 miles northwest of Oslo, Breivik boards 
a ferry to the island of Utøya, where roughly 600 youths are attending a 
summer camp organized by Norway’s Labor Party. The island is isolated and 
tiny, only a little larger than Rockefeller Center in New York City. Minutes 
after arriving on Utøya, and appearing trustworthy in his false uniform, 
Breivik draws his weapons and begins killing people. Over the next hour he 
fires hundreds of rounds. He lines up campers against the wall of a cabin and 
executes them. He shoots teenagers as they attempt to swim away from the 
island. He discovers young men and women feigning death, by lying on the 
ground among the slain, and shoots them in the head. Survivors will later 
report that Breivik persuaded those hidden to come forward by saying he 
was a policeman, and that he was laughing and shouting as he killed them. 
After 50 minutes, Breivik calls the police saying: “Yes, hello, my name is 
Commander Anders Behring Breivik from the Norwegian anti-communist 
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resistance movement. I’m on Utøya for the moment. I want to give myself 
up” (Melle 2013). After this call he continues shooting. In his first inter-
rogation after being taken into custody, Breivik again claims to be com-
mander of the Knights Templars Norway and states that “the people on the 
island were category C traitors” (Melle 2013). What happened on the island 
was unfortunate, he tells authorities, because he had the right to “kill cat-
egory A and B traitors, but not a mandate to kill category C traitors” (Melle 
2013). Between the Oslo bombing and the Utøya murders, Breivik kills 77 
people that day, 55 of them teenagers. 
 Norway’s legal system employs what is sometimes called the “medical 
model” of legal insanity: If a defendant is judged to have been psychotic at 
the time he or she committed a criminal act, then that defendant is to be 
excused from punishment (Moore 2014). Such judgments depend heavily, 
if not entirely, on psychiatric testimony. Breivik’s initial review, conducted 
by a team of psychiatrists, found that he was psychotic—and thus legally 
insane—because he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Many of 
Breivik’s outlandish beliefs were construed, through the lens of this diag-
nosis, as “persistent, systematized, bizarre delusions” (Bortolotti, Broome, 
and Mameli 2014). But a second review, conducted by a different team of 
psychiatrists, found that Breivik suffered from antisocial and narcissistic 
personality disorders but  not paranoid schizophrenia and was therefore 
not psychotic. The panel of judges hearing Breivik’s case found this sec-
ond review more persuasive, and Breivik was judged legally sane and sen-
tenced to 21 years in prison, a term that can in principle be renewed until 
Breivik’s death. 
 From the calculated horror of Breivik’s crimes to the bizarre and delu-
sional beliefs he expressed before and after the attacks, to the conflicting 
psychiatric diagnoses and Norwegian law’s unusual deference to medical 
expertise in determining legal insanity—the facts of Breivik’s case raise a 
number of troubling and thorny questions. We may find ourselves pulled 
in contrary directions, feeling on the one hand that any person who 
planned and executed these crimes deserves the harshest punishment pos-
sible under the law; and on the other hand that it would be unjust to pun-
ish someone who does not understand or cannot control his behavior and 
is therefore undeserving of blame. What was the state of Anders Breivik’s 
sanity at the time of his crime, and how and why does the answer to that 
question matter? If Breivik was truly suffering from paranoid schizophrenia 
©MIT Press.  For review purposes only.
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in 2011, does that mean he was not morally responsible for his actions 
and is therefore undeserving of legal punishment? What is the relevance 
of mental illness in general, or a specific mental illness in particular, to 
responsibility? How much evidentiary weight, if any, should a psychiatric 
diagnosis carry in deciding whether a defendant can properly be said to 
deserve punishment for his or her crime? 
 Brian Dugan 
 It is February 1983, and Brian Dugan is cruising aimlessly around the west-
ern Chicago suburbs. 4 Now 26 years old, he has spent the last ten years in 
and out of prison and the legal system, charged with an array of increas-
ingly violent offenses, from burglary and battery to arson and attempted 
kidnapping. Jeanine Nicarico is alone at her house in Naperville, Illinois, 
home from school with the flu. She is ten years old. Dugan has been knock-
ing on doors in the neighborhood, half-randomly, hoping to find an unoc-
cupied house where he can break in and steal some tools. He knocks on 
Jeanine’s door, and although she refuses to let him in, her way of answering 
Dugan’s questions leaves no doubt that she is home alone. Dugan breaks 
in the front door, abducts Jeanine, rapes her, and beats her to death with 
a tire iron. Jeanine’s body is found two days afterward. The shock of this 
heinous crime, committed in broad daylight on a quiet suburban street, 
convulses authorities into a frantic—and arguably incautious—search 
for the perpetrator. Pretending to have knowledge of the case in a mis-
guided attempt to claim the $10,000 reward, a young man named Rolando 
Cruz winds up attracting police suspicion and finds himself arrested 
and charged with Jeanine’s murder, along with a man named Alejandro 
Hernandez. With suspects in custody, Brian Dugan is free to resume his 
hunting. 
 In July of 1984, Dugan sideswipes a young woman’s car, running her 
off the road. She is Donna Schnorr, a 27-year-old nurse, and a stranger to 
Dugan. He forces her into his car, binds her, and drives her to an aban-
doned quarry a few miles away, where he rapes and drowns her. Less than 
a year after that, in May of 1985, Dugan—not yet a suspect in the Schnorr 
killing—commits a string of intermittently successful abductions and rapes, 
the victims of which are all young women or girls. On June 2, Dugan’s spree 
reaches its final phase; he kidnaps seven-year-old Melissa Ackerman, rapes 
her, and drowns her. A few weeks later her body is found, and Dugan is 
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arrested shortly afterward; another young girl had been with Melissa at the 
time of the abduction, but had narrowly escaped, and she had been able to 
describe Dugan’s car to police. 
 Under questioning, Dugan confesses to the Ackerman and Schnorr mur-
ders, each of which earns him a life sentence. He informally confesses to 
the Nicarico murder as well, but will only offer a formal confession if he can 
avoid the death penalty; prosecutors reject his offer. Eventually, DNA evi-
dence is developed linking Dugan to Jeanine Nicarico’s death; he is indicted 
for her murder in 2005 and pleads guilty in 2009, hoping to avoid the death 
penalty. As the sentencing phase of his trial begins, Dugan’s attorneys are 
casting about for any evidence that might help mitigate their client’s guilt 
in the eyes of the jury and keep him off death row. They learn of a cogni-
tive neuroscientist in New Mexico named Kent Kiehl, who is an expert on 
psychopaths. Kiehl has spent years collecting data on the neuropsychol-
ogy of violent offenders. He claims that the brains of psychopaths show 
distinctive patterns of dysfunction and decreased activity, particularly in 
areas responsible for integrating emotion with cognition, which explain 
why psychopaths often appear to be devoid of empathy, remorse, or sensi-
tivity to the harms they cause. Dugan’s lawyers reach out to Kiehl, offering 
him the chance to study, in Kiehl’s words, “one of the classic psychopaths 
in American history” (Hughes 2010, 342). 
 Kiehl accepts the offer and sets to work, gaining access to Dugan’s case 
files and conducting lengthy interviews with him. He scans Dugan’s brain 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and tests him on the 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist, an interview technique meant to detect the 
presence of psychopathy through 20 distinct personality and behavioral 
traits. Dugan scores a 38 out of 40 on the test, placing him, in Kiehl’s esti-
mation, above the 99th percentile of all prison inmates. Dugan’s files reveal 
a childhood that bears the typical marks of a budding psychopath: cruelty 
to animals, chronic bed-wetting, and fascination with fire. 
 In October of 2009, Kiehl participates in a Frye hearing, a legal proceed-
ing meant to assess whether some body of scientific evidence can be admit-
ted at trial. The prosecution argues that allowing Kiehl to testify using the 
actual brain scans could unduly bias the jury, while the defense argues that 
the scans are necessary for a complete and accurate picture of Dugan’s men-
tal state. The judge finds a middle ground of sorts, allowing Kiehl to share 
his findings with the jury but not to use the actual brain scans obtained 
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from Dugan. Kiehl takes the stand in November; his testimony is used to 
ground the defense’s argument that Dugan, as a psychopath, was not fully 
in control of himself at the time of his crimes and was not capable of sup-
pressing or managing his powerful impulses to harm, violate, and kill. The 
horrific rape and murder of Jeanine Nicarico was perpetrated not by an 
evil man, but by a sick man, they argue, and his condition calls for a more 
lenient sentence, or at least something short of execution. The prosecu-
tion counters Kiehl’s testimony with their own expert witnesses, who point 
out the evidential limitations of fMRI and argue that a brain scan taken 
26 years after the crime in question can hardly illuminate Dugan’s mental 
state at the time of Nicarico’s murder. Even if Kiehl had ironclad evidence 
of Dugan’s psychopathy—not just now but back in 1983—there should 
be serious doubts about whether psychopathy should eo ipso mitigate a 
defendant’s blameworthiness in the eyes of the law. The jury in Dugan’s 
case returns the unanimous verdict needed for the death penalty, and Brian 
Dugan is sentenced to die. 
 In March 2011, however, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed a bill abol-
ishing the state’s use of the death penalty and commuting the death sen-
tences of 15 Illinois prisoners—Dugan among them. The death penalty had 
already been under a statewide moratorium since 2000, and Quinn’s action 
was the culmination of concerns about wrongful convictions and execu-
tions of the innocent. In a bizarre twist, two of the most notorious wrong-
ful convictions were those of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez, who 
had both been convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder 
of Jeanine Nicarico. Had Brian Dugan not made his informal confession 
back in 1985, the two men might well have been executed. (Gutowski and 
Mills 2014). 
 Today Brian Dugan is 61 years old, serving life without the possibility 
of parole in the Stateville Correctional Center, less than 20 miles from the 
scene of his first murder. He appears to have evaded the death penalty for 
good, but he will die in prison. In his first published interview, in 2014, 
Dugan told reporters from the  Chicago Tribune that he still felt he was a 
danger to society, prone to intense and uncontrollable rage. Describing the 
murders, he said, “I was driven by some kind of an impulse that kept grow-
ing. I could not stop” (Gutowski and Mills 2014). 
 The case of Brian Dugan presents a number of difficult and unsettling 
questions: How should we understand the moral responsibility, or lack 
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thereof, of the psychopath? Are psychopaths “more bad than mad,” as Mai-
bom (2008) argues, or is it the other way around? To what extent do psy-
chopaths understand the wrongness or harmfulness of their actions? If they 
seem unmoved or unmotivated by moral norms, can they really be said to 
 understand them? And what about volitional control, often described as a 
crucial component of moral responsibility—are psychopaths truly in con-
trol of their actions? What are the cognitive and neurological signatures of 
psychopathy? What sorts of evidence from psychiatry and neuroscience 
would indicate that a defendant was psychopathic, and should that same 
evidence tend to reduce, or excuse the defendant from, culpability? If there 
is such evidence to be had, how should it be responsibly introduced into 
the courtroom? 
 Responsible Brains 
 The case studies above involve people who caused serious harm, but to 
whom attributing responsibility for that harm seems particularly difficult. 
They are cases where pertinent-seeming facts about the agents’ minds 
muddle the intuitions about agency and intent that underpin attributions 
of responsibility and, therefore, blame. As a result, courts have disagreed 
about the level of blame and punishment that ought to be assigned to these 
sorts of agents—for instance, child soldiers (or children, generally) and the 
mentally ill, including psychopaths. 
 In this book we will argue that specific facts about the brains of the 
agents discussed in these cases, now available due to recent progress in 
neuroscience, can strongly inform assessment of their culpability. This may 
not sound like a bold claim: It is not very controversial, after all, to say that 
facts about people’s mental capacities and mental states may be relevant 
to their responsibility for harmful acts. And it is similarly commonplace 
to believe that facts about an agent’s brain are relevant to facts about that 
agent’s mind. Some scientists and philosophers would even prefer to say 
that facts about the mind simply are facts about the brain because mental 
states simply are a type of brain state. 5 
 However, one needn’t go this far to find persuasive the idea that learn-
ing about how the brain works can tell us about how the mind works, or 
that facts about a person’s brain might bear on his or her responsibility. 
Agents who have a certain level of plaque and tangles in the brain—both 
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of which are highly correlated with Alzheimer’s disease—can be expected 
to suffer from certain mental incapacities. The link between brain plaque 
and the symptoms of Alzheimer’s is strong enough for facts about levels 
of plaque and tangles to be relevant in at least certain cases of attributing 
responsibility. For example, imagine Bob is accused of the theft of a brief-
case. Bob claims his Alzheimer’s disease led him to forget that the briefcase 
was not his. However, the victim of the theft claims Bob took the briefcase 
intentionally and is malingering (is just pretending he has Alzheimer’s). If 
new brain imaging techniques allowed a medical specialist to provide good 
evidence of plaque buildup or tangles in Bob’s brain, this would obviously 
be relevant to his excuse. 
 Evidence of traumatic brain injuries or other indications of structural 
brain damage, severe chemical imbalances, and extremely low activity in 
certain regions of the brain would all appear to be relevant in at least some 
cases where we are attempting to attribute responsibility to an agent. To 
take another example, imagine that Carl, normally a law-abiding family 
man, starts acting impulsively and then gropes a neighbor. He is discovered 
to have a brain tumor, and when it is removed, he once again becomes 
considerate and law-abiding. Eight months later, he is arrested for groping 
a sales assistant. Evidence that Carl’s brain tumor has now returned would 
seem, prima facie, relevant to his responsibility for the assault. 
 We think the pertinent question is not  whether brain science can inform 
responsibility assessments, but in which sorts of cases, and to what extent. 
If facts about the brain bear on facts about the mind, then neuropsycho-
logical findings must in at least some cases inform assessment of defen-
dants’ mental states, so long as we can link facts about brains to facts about 
the capacities necessary for responsible agency. All we need, it seems, is to 
determine which mental capacities are necessary to responsible agency, and 
which facts about brains are relevant to those capacities. 
 This line of thought is disquieting to many prominent philosophers 
interested in agency and responsibility. 6 Stephen Morse, for example, wor-
ries about the spread of “brain overclaim syndrome” (Morse 2006a) into the 
legal realm. Morse argues that some commentators allow their enthusiasm 
for the fast-moving world of neuroscience, with its seductive fMRI images 
and buzzy breakthroughs, to lead them astray. They apply neuropsycho-
logical findings incautiously and overestimate their true relevance to ques-
tions of criminal responsibility. Though he is not hostile to neuroscience 
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in general, Morse is decidedly skeptical about the evidential significance of 
neuroscientific results in criminal trials. In his survey of  Roper v. Simmons , 
a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court eventually ruled that the death 
penalty for crimes committed while the defendant was under the age of 18 
was unconstitutional, Morse discusses the neuroscientific findings adduced 
in amicus briefs to the Court: 
 Assuming the validity of the neuroscientific evidence, what does it add? The rigor-
ous behavioral studies already confirm the behavioral differences [between adoles-
cents and adults].… At most, the neuroscientific evidence provides a partial causal 
explanation of why the observed behavioral differences exist and thus some further 
evidence of the validity of the behavioral differences. It is only of limited and in-
direct relevance to responsibility assessment, which is based on behavioral criteria. 
(Morse 2006a, 408–9) 
 Morse’s worries about neuroscience’s incursion into the criminal law 
mostly concern the prospect that overzealous legal scholars will wrongly 
inflate the significance of neuroscientific findings, or that neuroscience—
which is after all a rather young scientific field—may get some things wrong 
altogether. That is, Morse worries that some are claiming the relevance of 
brain science to legal responsibility without building an appropriate bridge 
between the two types of facts. At times, he even seems to worry that such 
a bridge cannot be built because “the way the brain enables the mind con-
tinues to be a mystery” (Morse 2013b, 512). 7 We would caution against 
thinking of brain and mind as two separate but causally related entities, 
though, and suggest that a good portion of the mystery derives from this 
thinking. But luckily, we will argue, we need not enter into such metaphysi-
cal disputes in order to develop an effective and sound approach to respon-
sibility grounded in science. Although Morse may be right to worry about 
certain aspects of the relationship between brain and mind—the mystery 
of how brain matter gives rise to conscious phenomenal experiences, for 
example—progress in neuroscience and cognitive science continues to 
inform our understanding of how the brain enables our cognitive capaci-
ties and functions. How a physical system can fulfill certain functions is 
not a great source of mystery, and we will argue (primarily in chapter 5) 
that our remarkable abilities to be responsible derive from these cogni-
tive functions, rather than our equally remarkable ability to be conscious. 
Given this, if we are clear on the capacities that matter to responsible 
agency, we should be increasingly able to use neuroscience to understand 
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how brain function supports or undermines these capacities as science 
progresses. 
 Other scholars have staked out positions at the other end of the con-
tinuum from Morse and worry that neuroscience will get it right—all too 
right, one might say, since they see the relevance of neuroscience to ques-
tions of responsibility and the criminal law as not only direct but radically 
disruptive. Scholars harboring these concerns tend to see our everyday folk-
psychological responsibility assessments as deeply committed to a libertar-
ian conception of free will, which is threatened by the findings emerging 
from brain science. 8 If their view is accurate, then a complete neuroscien-
tific understanding of human agency might well supplant our cherished 
commonsense notions of free will, agency, and responsibility, which 
ground our legal practices of blame and punishment. This may then lead 
to verdicts about responsibility that differ strongly from our commonsense 
notions of who should be held responsible. A prominent line of conjecture 
holds that neuroscientific data may require us to shift away from retributive 
(blame-based) punishment and toward a rationale for punishment that is 
exclusively concerned with deterrence and/or rehabilitation. 9 
 Defenders of this sort of view ignore the proliferation of work articulat-
ing compatibilist theories of responsibility, however. A large and diverse 
group of scholars see the folk intuitions about agency and responsibility 
as compatible with physical determinism and believe that what libertarian 
commitments exist can be revised without much disruption to the structure 
of responsibility assessments. 10 That is, the folk-psychological concepts that 
underpin assessments of responsibility—where mental capacities and states 
are attributed to an agent to determine the level of praise or blame that 
constitutes an appropriate response to a particular action—do not seem to 
be undermined by the brute fact that these capacities and states are realized 
in the brain (which is a physical object subject to certain deterministic rules 
or laws). 
 For example, the most popular philosophical account of the capacities 
necessary for responsibility, the “reasons-responsiveness” account made 
famous by Fischer and Ravizza (1998), understands such capacities as com-
patible with determinism. On one version of a reasons account, a person 
is moderately responsive to a reason for action if he or she would have 
recognized that particular reason as relevant to his or her action in a “close 
possible world,” which means a world we can imagine that is very like our 
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own except for particular details (this is called a counterfactual reasons 
account) (Vargas 2013). That is, under other similar circumstances the per-
son would have recognized the relevance of the reason to his or her actions, 
possibly causing the person to inhibit the action altogether. For example, 
in the actual world, Mary doesn’t remember to pick her child up from soc-
cer because she is trying to finish work due by the end of the day. But if, 
in another possible world, her deadline were to be extended, she would 
have remembered. This shows she is appropriately sensitive to reasons to 
pick up her child, even if she forgets under certain conditions. On this sort 
of view, even claims that a person “ought to have been more careful” or 
acted differently would seem compatible with the truth of determinism. 
We will discuss philosophical theories of responsibility and free agency in 
more detail in chapter 3, but it will suffice to say here that the compatibilist 
theories advocated by many philosophers leave wide open the possibility 
that responsibility assessments may be informed by brain science without 
undermining attributions of praise and blame, or application of punish-
ment, and in so doing depriving us of justified retributive punishment. 
 In this book we argue for what we see as a moderate position: Neurosci-
ence is both relevant to responsibility and consistent with our ordinary 
“folk” conceptions of it. Evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience 
can illuminate and inform the nature of responsibility and agency in spe-
cific, testable ways. We are not alone in this view. Neuroscientist and phi-
losopher Adina Roskies, for instance, has conjectured that “neuroscience 
might enable us to develop a more sophisticated view of responsibility that 
takes into account both the cognitive demands and the control demands 
made by intuitive and legal notions of responsibility, and reconciles them 
with a scientifically informed view of the brain as a physical system that 
governs our actions” (Roskies 2006, 423).  
 The majority of our argument in this book constitutes our effort to take 
up this challenge. Of course, there are existing accounts, especially from 
philosophers of law, examining the psychological capacities that ground 
criminal law verdicts (Duff 2004, Moore 1997, Morse 2006b). Our theo-
ry’s novelty lies in its effort to inform what exactly these capacities are 
and how they can make us responsible with findings from neuroscience, 
many of which are recent. The criminal law, as a high-stakes repository of 
folk-psychological judgments about responsibility, carries an implicit com-
mitment to a view of human agency as basically free and reason-based. 
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The image of human agency given by contemporary brain science seems 
irreconcilably different: that of beings whose actions are governed by the 
mechanistic churn of an immensely complex physical system. Our goal is 
to show that these two conceptions of human agency are not in fact incom-
patible. We will offer, in Roskies’s terms, a sophisticated view of responsibil-
ity that can both serve our folk and legal purposes and be reconciled with 
and reinforced by a mature scientific understanding of the brain. Hence, 
our title:  Responsible Brains . 
 The Road Ahead 
 In the chapters to come, we will argue that folk conceptions of respon-
sibility, which underpin and are reflected in the structure of criminal 
offenses and verdicts, implicitly refer to a particular set of cognitive and 
volitional capacities. These capacities are implemented by brain structures 
primarily—though not exclusively—belonging to the cognitive control 
network and are known to the neuropsychological field as  executive func-
tions . 11 These functions are what allow us to be agents with reasons, plans, 
and values and to coordinate our behavior accordingly as we move through 
a complex world. Executive functions—such as attentional control, plan-
ning, inhibition, and task switching—are therefore uniquely well suited 
to ground a reasons-responsiveness account of the capacities necessary for 
moral responsibility, including both sensitivity to morally or legally rel-
evant reasons and the volitional control to act in accordance with those 
reasons. 
 When we analyze paradigmatic cases of legal responsibility, as well as 
cases “from the margins” of excuse, as Shoemaker (2015) labels them, we 
find that legal responsibility is contingent upon a person’s having the 
capacity for some baseline level of executive function, either at the time 
a crime is committed or for some significant period of time before the 
crime. We claim the law assumes that citizens possess some baseline execu-
tive capacity, and that cases of legal responsibility are cases in which an 
offender either exercised executive functions with regard to the criminal act 
or could have done so, in the counterfactual sense described above (unless 
some justification applies). We will argue, further, that cases of legal excuse 
tend to be cases where an offender had severely compromised executive 
functions—because, for instance, he or she suffered from schizophrenia or 
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was too young at the time of the offense to have had a minimally mature 
set of executive capacities. 
 Let us map out the road ahead. The early chapters of this book present 
our executive theory of responsibility, along with its philosophical and sci-
entific foundations. Chapter 2 will give a detailed review of the current 
neuroscientific research on executive functions—what they are, how they 
are realized in the brain, and how they are measured and assessed. We will 
discuss the relationship between the various executive functions, their 
organization, the extent to which they are separable, and their relevance 
to reasons-responsiveness. Chapter 3 will motivate our position and place 
it within the broader philosophical landscape of theories about free agency 
and moral responsibility. Chapter 4 describes how our theory meshes with 
legal theory and the criminal law itself. 
 In chapters 5 through 7, we attempt to further support our theory 
by arguing its merits compared to those of a prominent competitor: the 
intriguing consciousness thesis advocated by Neil Levy (2014), according 
to which consciousness is crucial for responsible agency. We have chosen 
to discuss Levy’s theory as much for its strengths as for what we see as its 
flaws. His view is nuanced, closely argued, and informed by attention to 
findings in the cognitive sciences. And indeed, we think Levy is barking up 
the right tree, because consciousness and executive function are strongly 
related phenomena. But they are different phenomena. We will argue that 
it is actually executive functions, which are anatomically and functionally 
separate from the process of consciousness itself, that do the important 
work of enabling reasons-responsiveness and, therefore, responsibility. 
 Having articulated the core of our theory and argued for its merits in 
comparison to a prominent rival view, we turn in the later chapters to 
extending and applying that theory. Chapter 6 continues what we see as 
a fruitful comparison between our theory and Levy’s while fleshing out 
our claim that our theory is folk-consistent, by explicating how it would 
assign specific truth values to everyday folk claims about responsibility. 
In chapter 7, we describe two cases in detail—one man who neglected to 
watch his children over the weekend, and another with a rare sleep disorder 
who attacked his in-laws in the middle of the night—explaining how our 
theory’s treatment of them is preferable to Levy’s. Chapter 8 takes up the 
puzzle of juvenile responsibility—how, on an executive account of respon-
sibility, the capacities for responsible agency take root and develop in the 
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maturing brain. The gradual maturation of executive functions calls for us 
to think of juvenile responsibility in scalar terms, with consequent implica-
tions for reforming the machinery of juvenile justice. Chapter 9 explores 
the ways that mental disorders or diseases may undermine responsible 
agency, applying the executive theory of responsibility to the doctrine of 
legal insanity and the question of whether psychopaths are culpable for 
the harms they cause. Chapter 10 discusses the implications of our view for 
thinking about criminal punishment. If we take seriously the notion that 
executive function is the key to responsibility, we may need to revise our 
sense of why punishment is justified in the first place, and how it should 
be applied to best serve the proper functions of criminal justice. Chapter 11 
will briefly recapitulate our main claims, revisit the cases described in the 
first part of this chapter, and outline some future avenues of inquiry and 
practical application suggested by our theory. 
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